Operations Western Allied invasion of Germany

1 operations

1.1 u.s. 12th army group crosses rhine (22 march)
1.2 u.s. 6th army group crosses rhine (26 march)
1.3 british 21st army group plans operation plunder
1.4 montgomery launches operation plunder (23 march)
1.5 german army group b surrounded in ruhr pocket (1 april)
1.6 eisenhower switches main thrust u.s. 12th army group front (28 march)
1.7 ruhr pocket cleared (18 april)
1.8 u.s. 12th army group prepares final thrust
1.9 u.s. 12th army group advances elbe (9 april)
1.10 u.s. first army makes first contact advancing russians (25 april)
1.11 u.s. 6th army group heads austria
1.12 link-up of u.s. forces in germany , italy (4 may)
1.13 british 21st army group crosses elbe (29 april)
1.14 german surrender (8 may)

operations

on 19 march, eisenhower told bradley prepare 1st army breakout remagen bridgehead anytime after 22 march. same day, in response 3rd army s robust showing in saar-palatinate region, , have strong force on rhine s east bank guarding 1st army s flank, bradley gave patton go-ahead assault crossing of rhine possible.

these orders patton had hoped for. american general felt if sufficiently strong force thrown across river , significant gains made, eisenhower might transfer responsibility main drive through germany montgomery s 21st army group bradley s 12th. patton appreciated opportunity had beat montgomery across river , win 3rd army coveted distinction of making first assault crossing of rhine in modern history. accomplish this, had move quickly.

on 21 march, patton ordered xii corps prepare assault on rhine on following night, 1 day before montgomery s scheduled crossing. while short notice, did not catch xii corps unaware. patton had received orders on 19th make crossing, had begun sending assault boats, bridging equipment, , other supplies forward depots in lorraine had been stockpiled since autumn in expectation of such opportunity. seeing equipment moving up, frontline soldiers did not need orders higher headquarters tell them meant.

the location of river-crossing assault critical. patton knew obvious place jump river @ mainz or downstream, north of city. choice obvious because main river, flowing northward 30 miles (48 km) east of , parallel rhine, turns west , empties rhine @ mainz , advance south of city involve crossing 2 rivers rather one. however, patton realized germans aware of difficulty , expect attack north of mainz. thus, decided feint @ mainz while making real effort @ nierstein , oppenheim, 9–10 mi (14–16 km) south of city. following primary assault, xii corps undertake, viii corps execute supporting crossings @ boppard , st. goar, 25–30 miles (40–48 km) northwest of mainz.

the terrain in vicinity of nierstein , oppenheim conducive artillery support, high ground on west bank overlooking relatively flat land east. however, same flat east bank meant bridgehead have rapidly , powerfully reinforced , expanded beyond river since there no high ground bridgehead defense. importance of obtaining deep bridgehead increased fact first access decent road network on 6 miles (9.7 km) inland @ town of grossgerau.

u.s. 12th army group crosses rhine (22 march)

the crossing of rhine between 22 , 28 march 1945.

on 22 march, bright moon lighting late-night sky, elements of u.s. xii corps′ 5th infantry division began 3rd army s rhine crossing. @ nierstein assault troops did not meet resistance. first boats reached east bank, 7 startled germans surrendered , paddled unescorted west bank placed in custody. upstream @ oppenheim, however, effort did not proceed casually. first wave of boats halfway across when germans began pouring machine-gun fire midst. intense exchange of fire lasted thirty minutes assault boats kept pushing across river , men had made across mounted attacks against scattered defensive strongpoints. germans surrendered, , midnight units moved out laterally consolidate crossing sites , attack first villages beyond river. german resistance everywhere sporadic, , hastily mounted counterattacks invariably burned out quickly, causing few casualties. germans lacked both manpower , heavy equipment make more determined defense.

by midafternoon on 23 march, 3 regiments of 5th infantry division in bridgehead, , attached regiment 90th infantry division crossing. tanks , tank destroyers had been ferried across morning, , evening treadway bridge open traffic. midnight, infantry units had pushed boundary of bridgehead more 5 miles (8.0 km) inland, ensuring unqualified success of first modern assault crossing of rhine.

two more 3rd army crossings—both viii corps—quickly followed. in morning hours of 25 march, elements of 87th infantry division crossed rhine north @ boppard, , 24 hours later elements of 89th infantry division crossed 8 miles (13 km) south of boppard @ st. goar. although defense of these sites more determined xii corps had faced, difficulties of boppard , st. goar crossings compounded more terrain german resistance. viii corps crossing sites located along rhine gorge, river had carved deep chasm between 2 mountain ranges, creating precipitous canyon walls on 300 feet (91 m) high on both sides. in addition, river flowed , unpredictable currents along part of course. still, despite terrain , german machine-gun , 20 millimetres (0.79 in) anti-aircraft cannon fire, viii corps troops managed gain control of east bank s heights, , dark on 26 march, german resistance crumbling along rhine, preparing continue drive next morning.

u.s. 6th army group crosses rhine (26 march)

adding germans′ woes, 6th army group made assault across rhine on 26 march. @ worms, 25 miles (40 km) south of mainz, 7th army s xv corps established bridgehead, consolidated southern shoulder of 3rd army s bridgehead next day. after overcoming stiff initial resistance, xv corps advanced beyond rhine, opposed small german strongpoints sited in roadside villages.

british 21st army group plans operation plunder

on night of 23/24 march, after xii corps′ assault of rhine, bradley had announced success. 12th army group commander said american troops cross rhine anywhere, without aerial bombardment or airborne troops, direct jab @ montgomery troops @ moment preparing launch own rhine assault following intense , elaborate aerial , artillery preparation , assistance of 2 airborne divisions, american 17th, , british 6th.

field marshal montgomery exhibiting legendary meticulous , circumspect approach such enterprises, lesson had learned in north african campaign against rommel , 1 not forget. thus, forces had approached east bank of river, montgomery proceeded 1 of intensive buildups of material , manpower of war. detailed plans, code-named operation plunder, comparable normandy invasion in terms of numbers of men , extent of equipment, supplies, , ammunition used. 21st army group had 30 full-strength divisions, 11 each in british 2nd , u.s. 9th armies , 8 in canadian 1st army, providing montgomery more 1,250,000 men.

plunder called 2nd army cross @ 3 locations along 21st army group front—at rees, xanten, , rheinberg. crossings preceded several weeks of aerial bombing , final massive artillery preparation. heavy bombing campaign usaaf , raf forces, known interdiction of northwest germany , designed destroy lines of communication , supply connecting ruhr rest of germany had been underway since february. intention create line bremen south neuwied. main targets rail yards, bridges, , communication centers, secondary focus on fuel processing , storage facilities , other important industrial sites. during 3 days leading montgomery s attack, targets in front of 21st army group zone , in ruhr area southeast pummeled 11,000 sorties, sealing off ruhr while easing burden on montgomery s assault forces.

montgomery had planned attach 1 corps of u.s. 9th army british 2nd army, use 2 of corps′ divisions initial assault. rest of 9th army remain in reserve until bridgehead ready exploitation. 9th army s commander—lieutenant general william hood simpson—and 2nd army s lieutenant-general miles c. dempsey took exception approach. both believed plan squandered great strength in men , equipment 9th army had assembled , ignored many logistical problems of placing 9th army s crossing sites within 2nd army s zone.

montgomery responded these concerns making few small adjustments plan. although declined increase size of american crossing force beyond 2 divisions, agreed keep under 9th army rather 2nd army control. increase simpson s ability bring army s strength bear exploitation, montgomery agreed turn bridges @ wesel, north of inter-army boundary, on 9th army once bridgehead had been secured.

in southernmost sector of 21st army group s attack, 9th army s assault divisions cross rhine along 11 miles (18 km) section of front, south of wesel , lippe river. force block german counterattack ruhr. because of poor road network on east bank of part of rhine, second 9th army corps cross on promised wesel bridges through british zone north of lippe river, had abundance of roads. after driving east 100 miles (160 km), corps meet elements of 1st army near paderborn, completing encirclement of ruhr.

another important aspect of montgomery s plan operation varsity, in 2 divisions of major general matthew ridgway s xviii airborne corps make airborne assault on rhine. in departure standard airborne doctrine, called jump deep behind enemy lines several hours prior amphibious assault, varsity′s drop zones close behind german front, within allied artillery range. additionally, avoid being caught in artillery preparation, paratroopers jump after amphibious troops had reached rhine s east bank. wisdom of putting lightly-armed paratroopers close main battlefield debated, , plan amphibious forces cross rhine prior parachute drop raised questions utility of making airborne assault @ all. however, montgomery believed paratroopers link advancing river assault forces, placing strongest force within bridgehead rapidly possible. once bridgehead secured british 6th airborne division transferred 2nd army control, while u.s. 17th airborne division revert 9th army control.

montgomery launches operation plunder (23 march)

plunder began on evening of 23 march assault elements of british 2nd army massed against 3 main crossing sites: rees in north, xanten in center, , wesel in south. 2 9th army divisions tasked assault concentrated in rheinberg area south of wesel. @ northern crossing site, elements of british xxx corps began assault (operation turnscrew) 21:00, attempting distract germans main crossings @ xanten in center , rheinberg south. initial assault waves crossed river quickly, meeting light opposition. meanwhile, operation widgeon began 2 miles (3.2 km) north of wesel 2nd army s 1st commando brigade slipped across river , waited within mile of city while demolished 1 thousand tons of bombs delivered raf bomber command. entering in night, commandos secured city late on morning of 24 march, although scattered resistance continued until dawn on 25th. 2nd army s xii corps , 9th army s xvi corps began main effort 02:00 on 24 march, following massive artillery , air bombardment.

for american crossing, 9th army commander—lieutenant general simpson—had chosen veteran 30th , 79th infantry divisions of xvi corps. 30th cross between wesel , rheinberg while 79th assaulted south of rheinberg. in reserve xvi corps′ 8th armored division, , 35th , 75th infantry divisions, 9th army s xiii , xix corps, each 3 divisions. simpson planned commit xix corps possible after bridgehead had been secured, using xiii corps hold rhine south of crossing sites.

after hour of extremely intense artillery preparation, general eisenhower himself viewed front, 30th infantry division began assault. artillery fire had been effective , timed assault battalions merely motored storm boats across river , claimed east bank against no resistance. subsequent waves of troops crossed, units fanned out take first villages beyond river weakest of opposition. hour later, @ 03:00, 79th infantry division began crossing upriver, achieving same results. heavier equipment ferried across rhine, both divisions began pushing east, penetrating 3–6 miles (4.8–9.7 km) german defensive line day.

douglas c-47 transport aircraft drop hundreds of paratroopers on 24 march part of operation varsity.

to north, british crossings had gone well, ground , airborne troops linking nightfall. then, paratroopers had taken first day s objectives in addition 3,500 prisoners.

to south, discovery of defensive gap in front of 30th infantry division fostered hope full-scale breakout possible on 25 march. when limited objective attacks provoked little response on morning of 25th, division commander—major general leland s. hobbs—formed 2 mobile task forces make deeper thrusts eye toward punching through defense altogether , breaking deep german rear. however, hobbs had not taken account nonexistent road network in front of xvi corps bridgehead. faced trying make rapid advances through dense forest on rutted dirt roads , muddy trails, defended few determined soldiers , placed roadblocks, task forces advanced 2 miles (3.2 km) on 25th. next day gained more ground, , 1 seized objective, having slogged total of 6 miles (9.7 km), limited progress forced hobbs abandon hope quick breakout.

in addition poor roads, 30th division s breakout attempts hampered german 116th panzer division. potent unit left commitment against allied rhine crossings in north, 116th began moving south dutch-german border on 25 march against germans considered dangerous threat, u.s. 9th army. enemy armored unit began making presence felt immediately, , end of 26 march combination of panzer division , rough terrain had conspired sharply limit 30th division s forward progress. 79th infantry division meeting fierce resistance south, general simpson s recourse commit of forces waiting on west bank of rhine. late on 26 march, 8th armored division began moving bridgehead.

although armored division bolstered offensive capacity within bridgehead, simpson more interested in sending xix corps across wesel bridges, montgomery had agreed, , using better roads north of lippe outflank enemy in front of 30th division. unfortunately, because of pressure germans in northern part of 2nd army bridgehead, british having trouble completing bridges @ xanten , therefore bringing of traffic across river @ wesel. montgomery allowing use of wesel bridges 9th army 5 out of every 24 hours, , road network north of lippe under 2nd army control, general simpson unable commit or maneuver sufficient forces make rapid flanking drive.

german army group b surrounded in ruhr pocket (1 april)

encirclement of ruhr , other allied operations between 29 march , 4 april 1945

by 28 march, 8th armored division had expanded bridgehead 3 mi (4.8 km) , still had not reached dorsten, town 15 mi (24 km) east of rhine, road junction promised expand xvi corps′ offensive options. on same day, however, montgomery announced east bound roads out of wesel turned on 9th army on 30 march rhine bridges leading city changing hands day later. on 28 march, elements of u.s. 17th airborne division—operating north of lippe river in conjunction british armored forces—dashed point 30 mi (48 km) east of wesel, opening corridor xix corps , handily outflanking dorsten , enemy south. general simpson had both opportunity , means unleash power of 9th army , begin in earnest northern drive surround ruhr.

simpson began moving elements of xix corps′ 2nd armored division xvi corps bridgehead on 28 march orders cross lippe east of wesel, thereby avoiding city s traffic jams. after passing north of lippe on 29 march, 2nd armored division broke out late night forward position xviii airborne corps had established around haltern, 12 mi (19 km) northeast of dorsten. on 30th , 31st, 2nd armored made uninterrupted 40 mi (64 km) drive east beckum, cutting 2 of ruhr s 3 remaining rail lines , severing autobahn berlin. rest of xix corps flowed wake of spectacular drive, 1st army completing equally remarkable thrust around southern , eastern edges of ruhr.

the 1st army s drive remagen bridgehead began breakout before dawn on 25 march. german field marshal walter model—whose army group b charged defense of ruhr—had deployed troops heavily along east-west sieg river south of cologne, thinking americans attack directly north remagen bridgehead. instead, 1st army struck eastward, heading giessen , lahn river, 65 mi (105 km) beyond remagen, before turning north toward paderborn , linkup 9th army. 3 corps of 1st army participated in breakout, on first day employed 5 infantry , 2 armored divisions. u.s. vii corps, on left, had hardest going due german concentration north of bridgehead, yet armored columns managed advance 12 mi (19 km) beyond line of departure. u.s. iii corps, in center, did not commit armor on first day of breakout, still made gain of 4 mi (6.4 km). u.s. v corps on right advanced 5–8 mi (8.0–12.9 km), incurring minimal casualties.

beginning next day, 26 march, armored divisions of 3 corps turned these initial gains complete breakout, shattering opposition , roaming @ throughout enemy s rear areas. end of 28 march, general hodges′ 1st army had crossed lahn, having driven @ least 50 mi (80 km) beyond original line of departure , capturing thousands of german soldiers in process. nowhere, seemed, germans able resist in strength. on 29 march, 1st army turned toward paderborn, 80 mi (130 km) north of giessen, right flank covered 3rd army, had broken out of own bridgeheads , headed northeast toward kassel.

a task force of vii corps′ 3rd armored division, included of new m26 pershing heavy tanks, spearheaded drive paderborn on 29 march. attaching infantry regiment of 104th infantry division armored division , following drive closely rest of 104th division, vii corps prepared hold territory gained. rolling northward 45 mi (72 km) without casualties, mobile force stopped night 15 mi (24 km) objective. taking advance again next day, ran stiff opposition students of ss panzer replacement training center located near paderborn. equipped 60 tanks, students put fanatical resistance, stalling american armor day. when task force failed advance on 31 march, maj. gen. j. lawton collins—commander of vii corps—asked general simpson if 9th army—driving eastward north of ruhr—could provide assistance. simpson, in turn, ordered combat command of 2nd armored division—which had reached beckum—to make 15 mi (24 km) advance southeast lippstadt, midway between beckum , stalled 3rd armored division spearhead. in afternoon of 1 april elements of 2nd , 3rd armored divisions met @ lippstadt, linking 9th , 1st armies , sealing prized ruhr industrial complex—along model s army group b—within american lines.

as march turned april offensive east of rhine progressing in close accordance allied plans. armies assigned cross rhine had elements east of river, including canadian 1st army in north, sent division through british bridgehead @ rees, , french 1st army in south, on 31 march established own bridgehead assault crossings @ germersheim , speyer, 50 mi (80 km) south of mainz. spectacular thrusts being made beyond rhine every day , enemy s capacity resist fading @ ever-accelerating rate, campaign finish germany transitioning general pursuit.

in center of allied line, eisenhower inserted new army—the 15th army, under u.s. 12th army group control—to hold western edge of ruhr pocket along rhine while 9th , 1st armies squeezed remaining german defenders there north, east, , south. following reduction of ruhr, 15th army take on occupation duties in region 9th, 1st, , 3rd armies pushed farther germany.

eisenhower switches main thrust u.s. 12th army group front (28 march)

on 28 march, these developments unfolded, eisenhower announced decision adjust plans governing future course of offensive. once ruhr surrounded, wanted 9th army transferred british 21st army group u.s. 12th army group. after reduction of ruhr pocket, main thrust east made bradley s 12th army group in center, rather montgomery s 21st army group in north planned. montgomery s forces secure bradley s northern flank while devers′ 6th u.s. army group covered bradley s southern shoulder. furthermore, main objective no longer berlin, leipzig juncture soviet army split remaining german forces in two. once done, 21st army group take lübeck , wismar on baltic sea, cutting off germans remaining in jutland peninsula of denmark, while 6th u.s. army group , 3rd army drove south austria.

the british prime minister , chiefs of staff opposed new plan. despite russian proximity berlin, argued city still critical political, if not military, objective. eisenhower—supported american chiefs of staff—disagreed. overriding objective swiftest military victory possible. should u.s. political leadership direct him take berlin, or if situation arose in became militarily advisable seize german capital, eisenhower so. otherwise, pursue objectives end war soonest. in addition, since berlin , rest of germany had been divided occupation zones representatives of allied governments @ yalta conference, eisenhower saw no political advantage in race berlin. ground western allies gained in future soviet zone merely relinquished soviets after war. in end campaign proceeded eisenhower had planned it.

ruhr pocket cleared (18 april)

the reduction of ruhr pocket , advance elbe , mulde rivers between 5 , 18 april 1945

the first step in realizing eisenhower s plan eradication of ruhr pocket. before encirclement had been completed, germans in ruhr had begun making attempts @ breakout east. had been unceremoniously repulsed vastly superior allied forces. meanwhile, 9th , 1st armies began preparing converging attacks using east-west ruhr river boundary line. 9th army s xvi corps—which had taken position north of ruhr area after crossing rhine—would assisted in southward drive 2 divisions of xix corps, rest of continue press eastward along xiii corps. south of ruhr river, 1st army s northward attack executed xviii airborne corps, had been transferred hodges after operation varsity, , iii corps, 1st army s v , vii corps continuing offensive east. 9th army s sector of ruhr pocket—although 1/3 size of 1st army s sector south of river—contained majority of densely urbanized industrial area within encirclement. 1st army s area, on other hand, composed of rough, heavily forested terrain poor road network.

by 1 april, when trap closed around germans in ruhr, fate sealed. in matter of days killed or captured. on 4 april, day shifted bradley s control, 9th army began attack south toward ruhr river. in south, 1st army s iii corps launched strike on 5th, , xviii airborne corps joined in on 6th, both pushing northward. german resistance, rather determined, dwindled rapidly. 13 april, 9th army had cleared northern part of pocket, while elements of xviii airborne corps′ 8th infantry division reached southern bank of ruhr, splitting southern section of pocket in two. thousands of prisoners being taken every day; 16–18 april, when opposition ended , remnants of german army group b formally surrendered, german troops had been surrendering in droves throughout region. army group b commander walther model committed suicide on 21 april.

the final tally of prisoners taken in ruhr reached 325,000, far beyond americans had anticipated. tactical commanders hastily enclosed huge open fields barbed wire creating makeshift prisoner of war camps, inmates awaited end of war , chance return home. looking forward going home, tens of thousands of freed forced laborers , allied prisoners of war further strained american logistical system.

u.s. 12th army group prepares final thrust

meanwhile, remaining allied forces north, south, , east of ruhr had been adjusting lines in preparation final advance through germany. under new concept, bradley s 12th u.s. army group make main effort, hodges′ 1st army in center heading east 130 mi (210 km) toward city of leipzig , elbe river. north, 9th army s xix , xiii corps drive elbe, toward magdeburg, 65 mi (105 km) north of leipzig, although army commander, general simpson, hoped allowed go way berlin. south, patton s 3rd army drive east chemnitz, 40 mi (64 km) southeast of leipzig, short of elbe, , turn southeast austria. @ same time, general devers 6th u.s. army group move south through bavaria , black forest austria , alps, ending threat of nazi last-ditch stand there.

on 4 april, paused allow rest of 12th u.s. army group catch up, 3rd army made 2 notable discoveries. near town of merkers, elements of 90th infantry division found sealed salt mine containing large portion of german national treasure. hoard included vast quantities of german paper currency, stacks of priceless paintings, piles of looted gold , silver jewelry , household objects, , estimated $250,000,000 worth of gold bars , coins of various nations. other discovery made 3rd army on 4 april horrified , angered saw it. when 4th armored division , elements of 89th infantry division captured small town of ohrdruf, few miles south of gotha, found first concentration camp taken western allies.

u.s. 12th army group advances elbe (9 april)

the 4 april pause in 3rd army advance allowed other armies under bradley s command reach leine river, 50 mi (80 km) east of paderborn. 3 armies of 12th u.s. army group in north-south line, enabling them advance abreast of each other elbe. 9 april, both 9th , 1st armies had seized bridgeheads on leine, prompting bradley order unrestricted eastward advance. on morning of 10 april, 12th u.s. army group s drive elbe began in earnest.

the elbe river official eastward objective, many american commanders still eyed berlin. evening of 11 april, elements of 9th army s 2nd armored division—seemingly intent on demonstrating how army take coveted prize—had dashed 73 mi (117 km) reach elbe southeast of magdeburg, 50 mi (80 km) short of german capital. on 12 april, additional 9th army elements attained elbe , next day on opposite bank awaiting permission drive on berlin. 2 days later, on 15 april, had abandon these hopes. eisenhower sent bradley final word on matter: 9th army stay put—there no effort take berlin. simpson subsequently turned troops attention mopping pockets of local resistance.

american tanks in coburg on 25 april

in center of 12th u.s. army group, hodges′ 1st army faced stiffer opposition, though hardly slowed pace. forces approached leipzig, 60 mi (97 km) south of magdeburg , 15 mi (24 km) short of mulde river, 1st army ran 1 of few remaining centers of organized resistance. here germans turned thick defense belt of antiaircraft guns against american ground troops devastating effects. through combination of flanking movements , night attacks, first army troops able destroy or bypass guns, moving leipzig, formally surrendered on morning of 20 april. end of day, units had taken leipzig joined rest of 1st army on mulde, had been ordered halt.

meanwhile, on 12th u.s. army group s southern flank, 3rd army had advanced apace, moving 30 mi (48 km) eastward take erfurt , weimar, , then, 12 april, 30 mi (48 km) through old 1806 jena napoleonic battlefield area. on day, eisenhower instructed patton halt 3rd army @ mulde river, 10 mi (16 km) short of original objective, chemnitz. change resulted agreement between american , soviet military leadership based on need establish readily identifiable geographical line avoid accidental clashes between converging allied forces. however, 3rd army began pulling mulde on 13 april, xii corps—patton s southernmost force—continued moving southeast alongside 6th u.s. army group clear southern germany , move austria. after taking coburg, 50 mi (80 km) south of erfurt, on 11 april, xii corps troops captured bayreuth, 35 mi (56 km) farther southeast, on 14 april.

as case throughout campaign, german ability fight sporadic , unpredictable during drive elbe-mulde line. areas stoutly defended while in others enemy surrendered after little more token resistance. sending armored spearheads around hotly contested areas, isolating them reduction subsequent waves of infantry, eisenhower s forces maintained eastward momentum. german holdout force of 70,000 in harz mountains—40 mi (64 km) north of erfurt—was neutralized in way, towns of erfurt, jena, , leipzig.

u.s. first army makes first contact advancing russians (25 april)

the final operations of western allied armies between 19 april , 7 may 1945 , change in soviet front line on period.

every unit along elbe-mulde line anxious first meet red army. last week of april, known soviets close, , dozens of american patrols probing beyond east bank of mulde, hoping meet them. elements of 1st army s v corps made first contact. @ 11:30 on 25 april, small patrol 69th infantry division met lone russian horseman in village of leckwitz. several other patrols 69th had similar encounters later day, , on 26 april division commander, maj. gen. emil f. reinhardt, met maj. gen. vladimir rusakov of russian 58th guards infantry division @ torgau in first official link-up ceremony.

25 april known elbe day.

u.s. 6th army group heads austria

while 12th u.s. army group made eastward thrust, general devers′ 6th u.s. army group south had dual mission of protecting 12th u.s. army group s right flank , eliminating german attempt make last stand in alps of southern germany , western austria. accomplish both objectives, lt. gen. alexander patch s 7th army on devers′ left make great arc, first driving northeastward alongside bradley s flank, turning south 3rd army take nuremberg , munich, continuing austria. french 1st army—under general jean de lattre de tassigny—was attack south , southeast, taking stuttgart before moving swiss border , austria.

initially, opposition in 6th u.s. army group s sector stiffer facing 12th u.s. army group. german forces there in less disarray north. nevertheless, 7th army broke out of rhine bridgehead, south of frankfurt, on 28 march, employing elements of 3 corps—the xv corps north, xxi corps in center, , vi corps south. xv corps′ 45th infantry division fought 6 days before taking city of aschaffenburg, 35 mi (56 km) east of rhine, on 3 april. south, elements of vi corps met unexpectedly fierce resistance @ heilbronn, 40 mi (64 km) german rear. despite wide armored thrust envelop enemy defenses, took 9 days of intense fighting bring heilbronn under american control. still, 11 april 7th army had penetrated german defenses in depth, in north, , ready begin wheeling movement southeast , south. thus, on 15 april when eisenhower ordered patton s entire 3rd army drive southeast down danube river valley linz, , south salzburg , central austria, instructed 6th u.s. army group make similar turn southern germany , western austria.

soldiers of 3rd infantry division in nuremberg on 20 april

advancing along new axis seventh army s left rapidly overran bamberg, on 100 mi (160 km) east of rhine, on way nuremberg, 30 mi (48 km) south. forces reached nuremberg on 16 april, seventh army ran same type of anti-aircraft gun defense 1st army facing @ leipzig. on 20 april, after breaching ring of anti-aircraft guns , fighting house-to-house city, did forces take nuremberg.

following capture of nuremberg, 7th army discovered little resistance xxi corps′ 12th armored division dashed 50 mi (80 km) danube, crossing on 22 april, followed several days later rest of corps , xv corps well.

meanwhile, on 7th army s right vi corps had moved southeast alongside french 1st army. in double envelopment, french captured stuttgart on 21 april, , next day both french , vi corps had elements on danube. similarly, 3rd army on 6th u.s. army group s left flank had advanced rapidly against little resistance, lead elements reaching river on 24 april.

as 6th u.s. army group , 3rd army finished clearing southern germany , approached austria, clear observers, allied , german alike, war over. many towns flew white flags of surrender spare otherwise inevitable destruction suffered resisted, while german troops surrendered tens of thousands, entire units.

link-up of u.s. forces in germany , italy (4 may)

on 30 april, elements of 7th army s xv , xxi corps captured munich, 30 miles (48 km) south of danube, while first elements of vi corps had entered austria 2 days earlier. on 4 may, 3rd army s v corps , xii corps advanced czechoslovakia, , units of vi corps met elements of lieutenant general lucian truscott s u.s. 5th army on italian frontier, linking european , mediterranean theaters. on 4 may, after shift in inter-army boundaries placed salzburg in 7th army sector, city surrendered elements of xv corps. xv corps captured berchtesgaden, town have been hitler s command post in national redoubt. passes alps sealed, however, there no final redoubt in austria or anywhere else. in few days war in europe over.

british 21st army group crosses elbe (29 april)

a british tank in hamburg on 4 may.

while allied armies in south marched alps, 21st army group drove north , northeast. right wing of british 2nd army reached elbe southeast of hamburg on 19 april. left fought week capture bremen, fell on 26 april. on 29 april, british made assault crossing of elbe, supported on following day reattached xviii airborne corps. bridgehead expanded rapidly, , 2 may lubeck , wismar, 40–50 miles (64–80 km) beyond river, in allied hands, sealing off germans in jutland peninsula.

on 21st army group s left, 1 corps of canadian 1st army reached north sea near dutch-german border on 16 april, while drove through central netherlands, trapping german forces remaining in country. however, concerned bypassed germans flood of nation , cause complete famine among dutch population near starvation, general eisenhower approved agreement local enemy commanders allow allies air-drop food country in return local ceasefire on battlefield. ensuing airdrops, began on 29 april, marked beginning of become colossal effort put war-torn europe again.

german surrender (8 may)

final positions of allied armies, may 1945.

by end of april, third reich in tatters. of land still under nazi control none in germany. escape route south severed 12th army group s eastward drive , berlin surrounded soviets, adolf hitler committed suicide on 30 april, leaving successor, grand admiral karl dönitz, task of capitulation. after attempting strike deal whereby surrender western allies—a proposal summarily rejected—on 7 may dönitz granted representative, alfred jodl, permission effect complete surrender on fronts. appropriate documents signed on same day , became effective on 8 may. despite scattered resistance few isolated units, war in europe over.